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Abstract
This note analyses the formation of Theresa May’s first cabinet. It locates her 
appointments against the backdrop of the Brexit referendum and compares them to 
those of other prime ministers who took office during the lifetime of a parliament. The 
scale of May’s reconstruction marks her out as one of the readier ‘butchers’ of 
Downing Street. It demonstrated her acceptance of the Brexit referendum result, 
signalled a clear break with Cameron and served to consolidate her power base. It also 
demonstrated the huge potential leeway enjoyed by new prime ministers. However, 
while wholesale ministerial butchery can be empowering, demonstrations of 
ruthlessness are no guarantee for future power. 
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2On Wednesday 13 July 2016, Theresa May became Britain’s new prime minister. Her 
predecessor, David Cameron, had announced his resignation less than three weeks 
earlier following the referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of the 
European Union, when 51.9% of voters backed leaving the EU or ‘Brexit’. May was 
well placed to succeed him. Her low-profile support for the ‘remain’ side during the 
campaign, and her swift acceptance that ‘Brexit means Brexit’ in the wake of the vote, 
made her the most ‘acceptable’ candidate for a bitterly divided Conservative Party 
(Quinn, 2012). Her appeal was further bolstered by her reputation as a ‘safe pair of 
hands’ (Coulson, 2016). As her rivals dropped out of the leadership contest during its 
parliamentary stage, May emerged as the only candidate.
Like previous prime ministers who took office during the lifetime of a 
parliament, May exercised her right to reshuffle or reconstruct her government. 1 The 
changes were extensive and in some cases surprising. A common theme of 
contemporary media coverage was May’s apparent ruthlessness in sacking a large 
number of former colleagues. Referencing Harold Macmillan’s notorious July 1962 
reshuffle, several newspapers christened her changes as ‘the day of the long knives’ 
(Ross and Hope, 2016).
This note examines the formation of May’s cabinet and the scale of her 
reconstruction. It first describes her cabinet-level changes before comparing them to 
those immediately undertaken by other prime ministers who took office mid-way 
1 There is no established academic convention on the use of the terms ‘reshuffle’ or 
‘reconstruction’ (cf. Alt, 1975, pp. 47-50). This note uses the terms interchangeably.
3through a parliament.2 A prime minister’s power to appoint and dismiss ministers is 
one of the few that is frequently exercised and directly observable. It is also hugely 
important. Ministerial and especially cabinet-level appointments can affect public 
policy (Allen and Ward, 2009), not to mention the cohesion, performance and 
standing of governments (Dewan and Dowding, 2005). They can also tell us 
something about the variable nature of prime ministerial authority (Heffernan, 2003) 
and differing prime ministerial styles (Alderman and Cross, 1985; Dowding and 
McLeay, 2011). In these respects, May’s reconstruction demonstrated both the huge 
potential leeway enjoyed by new prime ministers and a steely willingness on her part 
to exercise her powers.
May’s first cabinet
The right to appoint and dismiss ministers is probably the most important power 
enjoyed by a British prime minister: it is ‘the one that gives by far the greatest 
leverage over his or her government’ (King, 1991, p. 37). The power is especially 
important for prime ministers who, like Theresa May, come to office without winning 
a general election and who have been unable to shape their frontbench team in 
opposition. Reconstructing the government is their first opportunity to do so, as well 
as to assert their authority and signal a change in regime. 
The same power is arguably even more important still for prime ministers who 
inherit profound policy challenges and divided parties, for they will want their 
ministers to pull together and collectively make politically difficult decisions. The 
2 The focus on cabinet-level appointments reflects practical considerations: junior 
ministerial appointments are generally less significant, and there is usually less 
information pertaining to them.
4situation May inherited was distinctly unpromising in both respects. Her government 
would need to negotiate withdrawal from the EU and choose whether to pursue ‘soft 
Brexit’—which would mean accepting some free movement of people in exchange for 
access to the single market—and ‘hard Brexit’—which would mean insisting on 
control of national borders and potentially sacrificing access to the single market. It 
would also have to develop a new economic strategy, one different to that pursued by 
David Cameron and George Osborne (Gamble, 2015). At the same time, May and her 
team would need to govern with a small parliamentary majority that included a 
number of potential rebels. The Conservatives were still divided over Europe—
specifically the choice between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ Brexit—and the party was reeling 
from both a bad-tempered referendum campaign and the fall of a prime minister.
Reshuffles are rarely straightforward. Harold Wilson (1976, p. 34) compared 
them to ‘a nightmarish multidimensional jigsaw puzzle’. Given her situation, May 
faced a particularly nightmarish puzzle. Like all prime ministers, she needed to be 
mindful of the qualities, suitability and utility of individual appointments (King and 
Allen, 2010). She also needed to be mindful of the cabinet’s overall composition, 
including its ideological, gender, regional and ethnic balance (see Heppell, 2014); and 
in her particular case, its members’ positions on Brexit.
May made six appointments on the evening of her entry into 10 Downing 
Street. The first to be announced were the great offices of state: Philip Hammond 
replaced the outgoing Osborne as chancellor of the exchequer, Boris Johnson replaced 
Hammond as foreign secretary, and Amber Rudd took over May’s old job of home 
secretary (see Table 1). May then confirmed that Michael Fallon would continue as 
defence secretary. The last two appointments made that evening were new positions 
5directly linked to Brexit. David Davis was named secretary of state for exiting the 
European Union, while Liam Fox took the post of international trade secretary.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The remaining cabinet-level appointments were announced the following day. 
These covered key domestic spending departments, such as health and education, as 
well as posts such as the leaderships of the House of Commons and House of Lords. 
The day-two announcements also included five ministers who, though not full cabinet 
members, were entitled to ‘attend cabinet’.3 Four of these cabinet-level appointments 
involved no change: Jeremy Hunt was reappointed to health, Jeremy Wright was 
retained as attorney general, and David Mundell and Alun Cairns remained as the 
Scottish and Welsh secretaries respectively. Mundell’s reappointment was almost 
inevitable given his status as Scotland’s only Conservative MP.
May then turned her attention to appointing junior ministers and government 
whips, a process that took several more days. By the end of it, she had filled nearly 
120 posts. In British politics, forming a government is an endurance event performed 
at the sprint. 
May’s new cabinet contained a large number of new faces, most of whom had 
at least some prior government experience. Boris Johnson was the notable exception. 
The ambitious former mayor of London and leading Brexit campaigner had been 
invited by Cameron to attend political cabinets, but was otherwise new to Whitehall. 
3 Like much else in British constitutional practice, the distinction between cabinet 
‘members’ and ‘attendees’ is ambiguous and open to interpretation. This note adopts 
an inclusive approach and counts both as cabinet ministers.
6Johnson’s elevation to foreign secretary was greeted with widespread surprise and 
disdain (Keate, 2016). He was in disgrace after withdrawing from the Tory leadership 
contest and seeming to abdicate responsibility for Brexit, and he seemed 
temperamentally unsuited for the job. Various theories were expounded across 
mainstream and social media: May was creating a potential a scapegoat in case the 
Brexit negotiations failed; she was trying to neutralise him as a potential rival and 
keep him away from domestic politics; she was trying to utilise his skills as someone 
who could sell post-Brexit Britain to the wider world; and/or she was hoping that his 
appeal among Tories would bolster her government’s standing. The truth probably 
rested in some combination of all these explanations.
Johnson’s appointment also serves to highlight the fate of May’s other rivals 
for the Conservative leadership. Four ministers had participated in the contest: 
Stephen Crabb, Liam Fox, Michael Gove and Andrea Leadsom. May found a place in 
her cabinet for Fox, who had been eliminated in the first round of voting among MPs, 
and Leadsom, whose sudden withdrawal after the parliamentary stage of the contest 
had gifted May the leadership. Crabb was offered a post but chose to quit following 
allegations about his private life. Only Gove, the former justice secretary and 
prominent Brexit campaigner, was not offered a job. His behaviour during the 
leadership contest, when he suddenly turned on Johnson and wrecked the latter’s 
candidacy, had angered many. Indeed, Gove was the second most high-profile 
casualty of May’s reshuffle after Osborne. The former chancellor himself had once 
been regarded as a possible successor to Cameron, but his stock had dipped after 
several embarrassing U-turns, and it fell further after he threatened a punitive 
emergency budget if the country voted for Brexit (Heath, 2016). He chose not to 
7contest the Tory leadership election. As with Gove, May must have judged that 
Osborne would bring little to her cabinet table.
Brexit, of course, overshadowed everything. May constructed a slightly more 
pro-Brexit cabinet compared to her predecessor’s. Seven of its 27 attendees, just over 
one-quarter, had supported leaving the EU (see third column of Table 1). By contrast, 
only five of the 30 ministers in Cameron’s last cabinet, one-sixth, had been pro-Brexit 
(there had been six until March 2016 when Iain Duncan Smith quit as work and 
pensions secretary). May increased the proportion of Brexiters in her cabinet by 
reducing its size and by bringing in Davis, Fox, Johnson, Leadsom and Baroness 
Evans. Their appointments were compensated for by the sacking of three Brexit-
backing cabinet ministers, including Gove. She also retained the pro-Brexit Chris 
Grayling, who had managed her leadership campaign, and promoted Priti Patel, who 
had previously attended cabinet, to the post of international development secretary.
Despite being slightly more pro-Brexit, the new cabinet was still markedly 
unrepresentative of Conservative parliamentary opinion, as was the government as a 
whole. More than 40% of Tory MPs (138 out of 330) but only 20% of all those 
initially appointed to a post in May’s government (19 out of 93) had backed leaving 
the EU (BBC News, 2016; Priddy, 2016). However, the three cabinet portfolios 
directly responsible for delivering Brexit were given to prominent leavers: Davis 
would now be directly responsible for planning withdrawal from the EU, Fox for 
Britain’s economic future outside of it, and Johnson, as foreign secretary, for 
representing Britain’s interests more generally. Together, these appointments served 
to underline May’s credibility as someone who would respect the referendum result. 
They also served to emphasise that pro-Brexit ministers now had to ‘own’ Brexit 
(Kettle, 2016). In practice, of course, ownership of these portfolios would not give 
8them control of this policy agenda: May would remain the ultimate arbiter so long as 
she remained prime minister (King, 1994, p. 211).
A final point worth making about the composition of May’s cabinet concerns 
its gender balance. It was widely briefed ahead of the reshuffle that May intended to 
appoint more women to high office. In the event, May named seven other women to 
her cabinet, taking the total to eight. Cameron’s last cabinet had only included seven 
‘members’, but it had also included three female ministers who ‘attended’, thereby 
taking the total to ten (out of 30) and enabling him to fulfil a pledge to give a third of 
senior government jobs to women (see Annesley and Gains, 2012). By contrast, there 
were only eight women among the 27 ministers who attended May’s cabinet. While 
May’s record vis-à-vis Cameron can be debated, it stands in marked contrast to 
Margaret Thatcher’s: Britain’s first female prime minister only ever appointed one 
other woman to her cabinet, Baroness Young.
New prime ministers’ cabinets
We now turn to the question of how Theresa May’s initial reconstruction compares 
with others in recent history. Since 1945, seven prime ministers took office mid-way 
through a parliament following the resignation of their predecessor: Sir Anthony 
Eden, who took over from the aging Sir Winston Churchill; Harold Macmillan, who 
replaced a sick and broken Eden; Sir Alec Douglas-Home, who replaced an ailing 
Macmillan; James Callaghan, who succeeded a flagging Harold Wilson; John Major, 
who took over from Margaret Thatcher; Gordon Brown, who finally achieved his 
ambition of supplanting Tony Blair; and May, who replaced David Cameron. All 
seven immediately reshuffled or reconstructed the government. Some change was 
inevitable, since the new prime minister had left vacant another office by virtue of his 
9or her accession. But the scale of change has varied considerably, depending on the 
circumstances and inclination of the new chief.
Table 2 lists the seven post-accession reshuffles that have occurred since 1945. 
In addition to showing the size of the new prime ministers’ cabinets—including all 
attendees—it also provides four crude indicators for assessing the extent of cabinet-
level change. The third column reports the number of ministers in the outgoing prime 
minister’s cabinet that the incoming prime minister chose not to reappoint. For 
convenience sake, this column is labelled ‘dismissals’, but the label embraces various 
forms of more-or-less forced departures from cabinet, including pre-emptive 
resignations and demotions to junior posts outside cabinet (see Alderman and Cross, 
1985, pp. 388–389). This note counts as dismissals those reported by King and Allen 
(2010), cross-checked with newly available evidence and updated with similarly 
coded appointments to Eden’s, Brown’s and May’s cabinets.4
The fourth column reports a ‘political continuity’ score, which refers simply to 
the proportion of all ministers in the new cabinet, including the prime minister, who 
had attended the previous cabinet. The fifth column reports a ‘portfolio continuity’ 
score, which refers to the proportion of ministers in the post-reshuffle cabinet that had 
attended the previous cabinet and held the same ministerial portfolios. The final 
column indicates which of the three great offices of state—the chancellor of the 
exchequer, the foreign secretary and the home secretary—were affected by the 
reshuffle.
4 King and Allen’s approach, also employed here, involved the extensive cross-
checking of available memoirs, biographies and diaries of ministers and prime 
ministers, as well as contemporary press coverage. Demotions from full membership 
of cabinet to ‘attending cabinet’ status are not counted as dismissals.
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Eden, Douglas-Home, Callaghan and Major stand out for having retained a 
relatively large proportion of their cabinet colleagues after taking office, even if they 
did not keep them in their previous posts. These four prime ministers’ ‘political 
continuity’ scores were all around the 80% level, and usually higher. The relevant 
score for Douglas-Home (78%) would almost certainly have been greater had Iain 
Macleod and Enoch Powell not refused to serve under him in protest at the manner of 
his appointment (Lord Home, 1976, p. 185). Among the seven prime ministers, Eden 
made the fewest changes. He not only retained most of Churchill’s ministers when he 
succeeded him in April 1955, but he also kept the majority of them in their existing 
jobs. Eden’s pursuit of continuity had much to do with his plan to call an immediate 
general election (Eden, 1960, p. 273). Afterwards, towards the end of the year, he 
conducted a second, more wide-ranging reshuffle. Major (1999, p. 205) too was 
mindful of a nearing election when he took office, and consciously avoided 
‘wholesale changes’. Callaghan, by contrast, potentially had three and a half years 
before he had to face the country. He therefore took the decision to sack several older 
ministers (Callaghan, 1987, p. 402). He would go on to conduct several more 
reshuffles before the 1979 election.
Macmillan’s and Brown’s initial cabinets had less continuity with their 
predecessors’. Two-thirds of Eden’s final cabinet were appointed to Macmillan’s first, 
whereas 59% of Brown’s new cabinet had attended Blair’s last. Moreover, both men’s 
initial reshuffles resulted in considerable portfolio discontinuity. Macmillan retained 
seven ministers (39% of the new cabinet) in their existing posts, whereas Brown kept 
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just two ministers in their previous jobs, defence secretary, Des Browne, and the chief 
whip in the Lords, Lord Grocott. Even then, Browne’s portfolio was extended to 
cover Scotland, so the relevant ‘portfolio continuity’ score (7%) is slightly inflated. 
In the case of Macmillan, the high turnover reflected the new prime minister’s 
need to draw a line under the Suez debacle (see Macmillan, 1971, pp. 185-200). He 
was lucky to inherit two vacancies, and he created further vacancies by sacking five 
ministers. (Macmillan replaced these seven individuals with six new appointments, 
thereby reducing slightly the size of the cabinet). In the case of Brown, the high 
turnover reflected the new prime minister’s wish to signal as clean a break as possible 
with his predecessor (Seldon and Lodge, 2010, p. 5). He was helped by the more or 
less voluntary decision of three ministers to follow Blair’s lead and resign. He 
dismissed a further seven ministers from cabinet, one of whom accepted a junior post.
The scale of change brought about by May’s first reshuffle was similar to 
Brown’s. Just over half of her new cabinet (56%) had attended Cameron’s, and only 
five ministers (19%) retained their previous portfolios (for details, see Table 1 above). 
May’s new government, like Brown’s, also saw new faces in all the great offices of 
state, and, to an even greater extent than Brown, she chose to dismiss erstwhile 
colleagues from cabinet. Some prime ministers have acquired reputations as good 
‘butchers’, notably Clement Attlee and Macmillan (Dowding and McLeay, 2011, p. 
160). May claimed her place among the butchers of Downing Street by demoting six 
former cabinet colleagues to non-cabinet posts and dispensing entirely with the 
services of seven others, most notably George Osborne and Michael Gove. The latter 
simultaneously earned the distinction of becoming the first British cabinet minister in 
history formally to contest a party leadership election and be sacked immediately by 
the victorious candidate. Callaghan found places in his cabinet for his five rivals, all 
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ministers, in the 1976 Labour leadership election; and Major likewise retained 
Douglas Hurd, one of his two rivals in the 1990 Tory leadership contest (Michael 
Heseltine, the other, was also given a cabinet job). 
May’s reshuffle also shared one other characteristic of Brown’s not reflected 
in Table 2: it involved substantial machinery of government changes. The most 
significant of these were the creation of a new Department of Exiting the European 
Union, a ministry she had promised during her leadership campaign, and a 
Department of International Trade. May also merged the old Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills and Department for Energy and Climate Change into a new 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, partly to create space 
around the cabinet table for the new Brexit-related portfolios. 
In one sense, the scale of change and May’s willingness to wield the knife 
reflected her judgement that she could move or dismiss so many, and that she needed 
to. In another sense, it reflected the actual leeway she inherited upon taking office. 
Prime ministers’ capacity to assert their will waxes and wanes (Heffernan, 2003). 
May, like Brown in 2007, had convincingly won a leadership election and faced no 
immediate intra-party challenge. Moreover, her rivals had thoroughly discredited 
themselves, her party was in disarray, and she offered a seemingly clear response to 
Brexit. Many Tories probably believed that there was no alternative, at least for the 
time being. May’s freedom to make personnel and organisational changes was thus 
considerable, and she exploited it the full. Few prime ministers undertake such 
extensive reconstructions, which are disruptive and potentially risky. But then, few 
prime minister inherit situations as difficult as those created by Brexit.  
Discussion
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Theresa May was expected to be a contender to succeed David Cameron when the 
time came, but she was also expected to face stiffer competition from George 
Osborne, Boris Johnson and others. Thanks to the Brexit referendum, her path to 
power proved somewhat easier. Like all new prime ministers, she was bound to make 
some changes to her cabinet once she took office. In the event, May’s initial reshuffle 
proved to be one of the most extensive in post-war British history. 
The scale of May’s reconstruction served at least three purposes. First, it 
signalled a clear break with Cameron and his ‘modernisation’ project (Kettle, 2016). 
Second, it demonstrated her acceptance of the referendum result, which she achieved 
by appointing more Bexiters to the cabinet, and especially to key posts. Third, and 
related, it served to protect her power base. By bringing Johnson and other high-
profile Brexiters into the cabinet, May widened the net of responsibility and reduced 
the likelihood of being challenged by her party’s ‘hard Brexit’ wing. While ultimate 
responsibility for delivering Brexit would rest with the prime minister, she would now 
be able to share some of that responsibility if things went wrong. The downside of 
making so many changes, of course, was that it involved the sacking of around 20 
former ministers. With a narrow parliamentary majority, even a handful of additional 
malcontents on the backbenches could cause problems.
While the changes revealed much about May’s response to Brexit and style of 
party management, they revealed less about her promise ‘to make Britain a country 
that works for everyone’ and her implicit strategy of moving to the centre ground. 
Partly because of the incoming Brexiters, her cabinet almost certainly became more 
right-wing than Cameron’s (Bale, 2016). That said, her allocation of portfolios 
seemed designed to keep some of these ministers away from domestic policy: Johnson 
as foreign secretary, Davis as secretary of state for exiting the EU, Fox as 
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international trade secretary and Patel as international development secretary would 
now be preoccupied with different aspects of external affairs. 
It remains to be seen if May’s government will tack to the centre. It also 
remains to be seen if party unity can be maintained under the pressures created by 
Brexit. Finally, it remains to be seen how long May’s authority will endure. As other 
prime ministers have realised, extensive reconstructions and wholesale ministerial 
butchery can be empowering. Yet, initial demonstrations of ruthlessness are no 
guarantee for future power. As the case of Gordon Brown demonstrates, prime 
ministerial authority can soon crumble under the weight of frustrated expectations, 
stored-up grievances and events.
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TABLE 1: Members and attendees of Theresa May’s cabinet, July 2016
Name Portfolio (new portfolio in italics) Position on 
Brexit
Theresa May Prime minister Remain
Philip Hammond Chancellor of the exchequer Remain
Boris Johnson Foreign secretary Leave
Amber Rudd Home secretary Remain
Michael Fallon* Defence Remain
David Davis Exiting the European Union Leave
Liam Fox International trade Leave
Jeremy Hunt* Health Remain
Elizabeth Truss Justice Remain
Justine Greening Education Remain
Chris Grayling Transport Leave
Damian Green Work and pensions Remain
Andrea Leadsom Environment, food and rural affairs Leave
Sajid Javid Communities and local government Remain
Greg Clark Business, energy and industrial strategy Remain
Priti Patel International development Leave
Karen Bradley Culture, media and sport Remain
James Brokenshire Northern Ireland Remain
Alun Cairns* Wales Remain
David Mundell* Scotland Remain
Baroness Evans Leader of the Lords Leave
David Lidington Leader of the Commons Remain
Patrick McLoughlin† Duchy of Lancaster and party chairman Remain
David Gauke† Chief secretary to the Treasury Remain
Ben Gummer† Cabinet office Remain
Jeremy Wright*† Attorney General Remain
Gavin Williamson† Chief whip Remain
Note: The list is based on information reported in Priddy (2016). Ministers’ positions 
on Brexit are derived from BBC News (2016). Names in bold are new cabinet 
members/attendees. * The named minister held the same job in Cameron’s cabinet. † 
Attending cabinet. 
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TABLE 2: New prime ministers’ first cabinets, 1955-2016








Sir Anthony Eden Apr 1955 18 1 89% 78% Foreign secretary*
Harold Macmillan Jan 1957 18 5 67% 39% Chancellor*
Home secretary
Sir Alec Douglas-Home Oct 1963 23 0 78% 52% Foreign secretary*
James Callaghan Apr 1976 23 4 83% 65% Foreign secretary*
John Major Nov 1990 22 2 86% 59% Chancellor*
Home secretary
Gordon Brown Jun 2007 27 7 59% 7% Chancellor*
Foreign secretary
Home secretary
Theresa May Jul 2016 27 13 56% 19% Chancellor
Foreign secretary
Home secretary*
Note: Data are derived from Butler and Butler (2011) and Priddy (2016). Dismissals include demotions to junior posts outside cabinet. * The 
new prime minister’s previous post.
